The Puerto Rico Education Project System Development In An
Island Paradise
Preparation Notes:
Puerto Rico has a population
of four million on an island of only 3,400 square miles. It is a U.S.
possession, and its citizens have full U.S. citizenship, but the people have chosen
to continue as a commonwealth rather than as a state of the Union. This means
that they receive protection and government aid, but they are not required to
pay Federal income taxes, and they have considerably more governmental freedom
than they would have as a state.
Puerto Rico is more densely populated than any state
of the U.S., and the proportion of people below the poverty level is much
greater than on the U.S. mainland.
The Puerto Rico Education Project (PREP) resulted from
a contract negotiated by a division of a large U.S. company (hereafter called
USCO) with the Puerto Rico Department of Education. The contract, funded by the
U.S. government, specified the installation of a large mainframe computer and
associated hardware, the design and implementation of a system to assist the
Department in evaluating the results of education programs funded by the
Federal government, and development of a large database containing data about
all the students, teachers, and schools throughout the island. The cost of the
hardware was about $5 million. It was expected that system design and development
would require another $10 million, consisting primarily of personnel costs, and
would take three years to complete.
At its peak the project staff would consist of about
25 people, of whom twenty would be relocated from the U.S. and the other five
would be local hires.
As the contractor, USCO agreed to perform the following:
- Design and implementation of methods and
procedures for the collection and storage of educational base-line data.
- Design and implementation of data handling
procedures.
- Design and development of mathematical models
and techniques to permit the continual assessment and evaluation of educational
programs.
- Design and implementation procedures for the
maintenance and updating of data in the base-line framework.
- Training of Puerto Rican personnel in effective
use of the system.
Project Staffing and Other Initial Decisions
Client perceptions of the success of prior projects
performed by the company was one of the most important factors in obtaining new
business, so client satisfaction was a primary objective, and quality control
was closely monitored.
It was clear to USCO
executives that the Puerto Rico project should be classified as a domestic assignment.
Puerto Rico was not a foreign country; it was part of the U.S., so the
international policies did not cover PREP. This was to be administered as a
domestic off-site project, the same as if it were in Oklahoma or Illinois.
There were to be three levels of management: Level 1,
the Project Manager, who would report to a USCO Vice President in headquarters;
Level 2, the System Design Manager, the Programming Manager, and the
Administration Manager; and Level 3, several first-line managers reporting to the
System Design and Programming Managers.
Next in line was Gary
Johnson, who had just completed a major project at the Pentagon and whose
expertise was in hardware. He had managed large numbers of people in complex
military projects, although none had any connection to education. Johnson had
never been involved in an off-site project, but this one appealed to him partly
because he saw this as an opportunity to aid humanity and alleviate poverty in
some small way.
This was to be a three-year project on a remote
island, so the families of project personnel would be moving there with them.
The moves were expensive for the company, so each employee selected was
required to agree in writing that the family would commit to staying in Puerto
Rico for three years. There were, of course, provisions for leaving sooner for
valid reasons such as illness of the employee or a family member. There were
also provisions that virtually guaranteed that the employees could count on continued
employment with USCO for at least 18 months after completion of the contract;
in jobs of equal or greater status and compensation.
The staffing plan called for a small team of systems
analysts and planners in the first year, building up gradually to a peak of 30
people by the second quarter of the second year. Programmers would not be
needed for the first nine months or so. The mainframe computer was being
custom-designed and would not be available until then, and there would be no
defined programs to write until a substantial part of the system design work
had been done. However, a large U.S. Army project had just been completed at
the Pentagon that had employed a number of young, bright programmers. Since it
had always been difficult to get good programmers when they were needed,
Johnson felt it prudent to hire seven of these programmers and take them along
to Puerto Rico. Smaller computers could be made available for them to work
with, and surely there would be important tasks that they could perform.
The Move to Puerto Rico:
It was becoming increasingly evident that conditions
in Puerto Rico were considerably different than had been expected. Living costs
were actually about 15% higher than in the U.S., particularly at the
supermarkets, which had to ship most products in from the U.S. and other
countries. Another problem that surfaced immediately was schooling. There were
about 15 school age children among the families in the project, and the school
term was starting shortly after their arrival. Belatedly, it was realized that
the basic reason for the PREP project was that the school system on the island
was mediocre; teacher and principal salaries were extremely low and facilities
were old and in poor condition. Some schools did not even have electricity.
Many of the windows were metal louvers rather than glass, and had to be closed
during the frequent rain showers. At such times, the pupils had to sit in the
dark until the rain stopped. Also, the language in the public schools was
Spanish, which none of the project children spoke. It was obviously necessary
that they attend private schools, at an average cost of $2500 per semester per
child. In a foreign assignment, private school would have been assumed, but
since this was a domestic assignment it was decided that a schooling allowance
was out of the question; it might have led to demands from employees on other
projects that USCO pay for private school tuition. Instead, for each employee
with school age children, salaries were raised just enough to cover the
schooling costs. It was understood by the company and by the employees that
this was a temporary raise and would be rescinded when they returned to the
U.S. mainland. It took several months for agreement to be reached on this
issue, and it was the source of considerable bitterness.
The most serious morale problems were with the spouses
of the employees. Most families had only one car, which the employee needed for
the trip to the office. Many of the wives were stranded at home most days, with
small children to care for, and neighbors who spoke little or no English. They
were also disturbed by the slower pace of life as compared to the U.S., which
they derisively termed the “mañana” philosophy, especially when they needed
some service professional such as a plumber or painter to come to the house.
Still another problem was a lack of telephone service; for the first year of
the project, most of the families were not able to obtain a phone. Two women
gave birth to babies and had no telephone service during the entire pregnancy.
Dolores Valdez, the secretary
who became Administration Manager, proved to be competent at finding good
office space. Banco Popular, the largest bank on the island, had just completed
a new building in Santurce, in the heart of the business district. Dolores
leased the entire 17th floor in that building, nicely furnished and with a
panoramic view of the city. However, she had never managed people, and she did
not like to get involved with the employees’ personal and financial problems.
She prevailed upon Johnson to make those decisions and fight those battles,
so he had little time for actually running the project. This was a source of
increasing frustration for him.
The PREP
Project
The data collection volumes to be dealt with in this
project were quite large. The Department of Education operates schools
throughout the island. At the time of PREP, there were more than 2,000 schools,
with 25,000 teachers serving nearly 800,000 pupils. Among all school systems in
the U.S., only those in New York City and Los Angeles are of comparable size.
In their pleasant office facilities the project
managers were beginning to recognize some of the problems that lay ahead. They
were still involved with getting their families settled, but what had seemed to
be a comfortable project schedule was looking increasingly tight. The system to
be developed was still not well defined, but the volumes were staggering to
contemplate. Burt Garfield analyzed the data entry requirements: for the 800,000
record Pupil file, assuming only 40 characters per record (much less than the
U.S. Office of Education wanted), data entry alone would require three hundred
person weeks of effort. This could not commence until forms and instructions
were designed, distributed, and returned, and it would have to be completed by
early spring so that files could be built for the programs to analyze. Although
this was a simple calculation, the contract estimates had not taken the data
entry effort into account. The scope of the project had to be cut down; it was
decided to collect data on only 200,000 pupils and to postpone the rest until
the second year.
The system was intended to have a planning and
research focus, since its main purpose was for program evaluation. To aid research,
it should be possible to select a representative sample from a large population
on demand, and software should be available to perform statistical calculations
on the data. As a planning tool, the system should readily provide data
relating to trends in pupil mobility, performance problems, inadequate
facilities, etc. The system was also expected to offer advantages to teachers
in the form of improved and timelier reports on pupil performance, such as test
results and pupil profiles.
Progress was disappointing, however. Some of the
problems that had been encountered included the following:
·
The programmers, who had been included in the initial contingent under the
rationale that they might be difficult to find later, were unhappy. The large mainframe
computer for which their programs were to be written would not be delivered for
several months. There were useful tasks to keep them busy, such as writing
specifications for programs, and smaller computers were available for some of
the tasks, but they were anxious to write and test the actual code for the main
system.
·
Data for every pupil and every teacher in one quarter
of the 2,000 schools was to be collected. The data collection procedure was
designed so that each teacher filled out the data form for each of his or her
pupils. In preparation for this, the project systems analysts interviewed
principals and teachers in a number of schools. None of the systems analysts
spoke Spanish well enough to communicate in that language. It was found that,
although most of the teachers could understand basic English, they were having
a very difficult time understanding the procedure, which involved some fairly
technical concepts for which they did not have the vocabulary. Some of the
analysts suggested to Gary Johnson that he hire two or three young Puerto Rican
college graduates as analysts; they would be able to explain the concepts to
the teachers in their own language. This suggestion was resisted by USCO
officials, who felt that the language problem had been solved by the provision
for Berlitz courses.
·
The data collection forms were printed and ready, but
there was no satisfactory delivery service for transporting them to the
schools, especially those located in the remote areas of the island. It became
necessary to rent vans and for the analysts themselves to deliver the forms,
and later to pick up the completed forms from the schools. This was quite
dangerous, because the rural interior areas were mountainous, the roads were
narrow and sharply curved, and often covered with slippery wet leaves.
Fortunately, the deliveries were completed with no accidents.
In spite of the problems, substantial progress was
made during the first year of the project. The mainframe computer was finally
delivered and the programming trips back to Washington were terminated.
Programming and testing was behind schedule, but not as much as it had been a
few months before. Dr. Hamill and the other Department of Education officials
were pleased with the system design and with the capabilities they would have
for evaluation, although they regretted the limited database. The curtailed but
still massive data collection effort was completed successfully, and forms were
shipped to a U.S. data entry service.
Most of the employees worked hard and conscientiously,
but morale was at low ebb and this was adversely impacting productivity. USCO
executives were concerned; costs were higher than budgeted, and some important
deadlines had slipped. A number of executives had visited the project, and most
of them had been deluged with complaints from employees. In the ninth month of
the project, Tom Ballard, who had just returned from a European assignment, was
asked to conduct an investigation to determine what needed to be done to get
back on schedule and on budget. He was also to take over direct responsibility
for the project, so Gary Johnson now reported to him. Within limits, Ballard
had authority to make any personnel and organizational changes that were
needed.
From his one-on-one discussions
with each employee, Ballard knew that about two-thirds of them had an intense
desire to be sent back to the U.S. They, and especially their family members,
were unhappy with living conditions, with the schools that their children were
attending, and with USCO. Their poor morale had an adverse effect on
productivity. Some employees spent a significant amount of time on the
telephone with their spouses, who often called to complain about home problems.
The other seven employees had a completely different
attitude; they and their families thought Puerto Rico was a fine place to live
and a wonderful opportunity to meet people from all over the world. They had
developed warm friendships outside the company and had learned to love the
outdoor activities that were available, such as golf and snorkeling. These
seven definitely wanted to stay, and they included some of the most productive
members of the project. There was considerable animosity between the two
groups, which was also hurting morale. Some of those who wanted to leave were
also excellent performers, and losing them would be a difficult problem at
first, but some of the most complex programming was near completion. Ballard
was fairly confident that the project could be implemented satisfactorily with
the nucleus of the seven, who wanted to stay, plus eight to ten young Puerto
Rican programmers and analysts who were available for hire. Some of these had
already worked on the project on a part-time, temporary basis, and had proved
to be fast learners and creative analysts.
However, he was not at all convinced that it would be
a good idea to let all those return to the U.S. who wanted to go. His orders
were to use this option only as a last resort. Finding jobs for all those sent
back would be a major problem, since some other large projects had recently
been completed. His biggest concern, though, was the precedent that would be
set. After all, these people had volunteered for the project, and had
willingly, even eagerly, signed up to stay for three full years. Based on this
commitment, the company had invested substantial resources in transporting them
and their belongings to Puerto Rico, and large amounts of executive time in
responding to their personal problems. The expense of sending them back was
also considerable. By no means had this investment been recouped, and since
meaningful U.S. assignments were scarce, they would not be nearly as
productive in the U.S. as they would have been by staying with the project. It
was an important project, too, with potentially great long-term benefits for
the children of the island; were these employees unaware of that? The company’s
policy guaranteed them a job in the U.S.; were they taking unfair advantage of
the company? Should they be allowed to break commitments without any penalty?
Certainly USCO’s policies were poorly thought out, but did not the employees
have some responsibility? Shouldn’t they have realized that living in Puerto
Rico would be different than in the U.S., and that it was not an “island
paradise?” Why did some employees love it here while most did not? Had the
Puerto Rico-haters given the island a fair chance? Did their attitude that they
did not like cultures different from theirs become a self-fulfilling prophecy?
As Tom Ballard entered the dining room, he could see that two groups were
separated, with those who wanted to leave on one side of the room, looking
angry, and the others with serious but expectant expressions. He was still
weighing the alternatives as he strode to the microphone.
Reflection:
JAGR
Consultant group was tasked with a difficult charge. Evaluating our companies
position, the current standings of the PREP, and offering a set of solutions
towards a failing project is never easy. But, that is why we hired them. The
consultants did a good job capturing the essence of PREP related business evaluation
with the following slides:
The first piece was important cause it is a reminder
that our primary objective is client satisfaction. The second component
illustrated what I thought was an essential piece for leading to a decision.
The
team from JAGR recommended keeping the seven employees that were happy and hire
Puerto Rican programmers.
I fundamentally agree with his plan but think that it
is lacking in full depth. There are some additional points to recommend and
realize.
The first piece to really understand is that
the project was set to fail by management. As members of the board, we have to
cognizant of internal mistakes so that we don’t repeat them.
The following is one area where we failed:
“John Piersall, the division Vice President for
Personnel, was dispatched to San Juan for three days to determine the need for
special policies. His mission was to evaluate whether language would be a
problem and whether there was a difference in cost of living. He stayed at the
Caribe Hilton, a pleasant hotel in an exotic setting on the beach. Although he
expected to find that most people would speak adequate English, he was
pleasantly surprised to find that the desk personnel, the bellhops at the
hotel, and the people running small shops in the beach area had an excellent
command of the language. He was not able to communicate with the maid who
cleaned his room, but he reasoned that the teachers and principals with whom
the PREP employees would be dealing were educated people and would have no
problems with English. To evaluate the cost of living, he discussed costs with
a wealthy friend of his who was the manager of the San Juan branch of Chase
Manhattan Bank. This individual had a beautiful home maintained by three
servants, and he had not noticed any difference in living costs as compared
with the U.S. He did mention that there had been some recent agitation by the independistas, a small fringe group who
wanted Puerto Rico to declare its independence from the U.S., but he felt that
the great majority of the people wanted to remain part of the U.S. and would
not be influenced by the independistas. Based on Piersall’s report, it was
decided that PREP could be administered as a standard domestic off-site
project, without special compensation or other new provisions."
Gary Johnson didn’t have a chance to succeed because
the initial planning stages were wrong. This is not to say that I am absolving
him or any of the other employees of their personal responsibilities to the
company and the project. The point is that as leaders we have to recognize
accountability is a two way street. We have to be accountable for our actions.
Mistakes are as serious as the results they cause, and in this case we are faced
with a real serious negative result.
Having set the stage for accountability, our course of
action should be to steer the project back towards a successful path. We should
meet with the our customers first. They are currently happy and we want to keep
it that way. While we won’t outright say our project is failing, we should take
the accountable approach and try to realign some goals now that we have more
current data. We wouldn’t want to endanger the welfare of the children’s
education just to meet a deadline. If we can afford to take some time to
regroup, we can at least plan more carefully and really assess our current
position. We can’t know how to get to where we want to go without first knowing
where we are. In this effort, we should also recognize that the current
deadline needs to be reassesed.
Once the position is really understood then we can go
on with the consultants plan to keep the seven employees that were happy and
hire Puerto Rican programmers. We want USCO to have more control over the
project and try to make the situation better for all involved. The timeline for
the project should also be revisited based on where the project is now.
Deadlines were missed, so the remaining aspects of the project need to be
re-planned so that new deadlines can be put in place based on the new project
direction that will be taken with Tom Ballard as the project manager. After
revisiting the project deadlines, this will allow USCO to increase customer
satisfaction because they will meet the new deadlines with proper planning.
Ultimately we want success and that will begin with realistic expectations, the
right employees, and support from management across the board.
